About oil pipeline disruption tracking
This page tracks operational status of major international crude oil pipelines, with a focus on routes that have become critical to global supply since the closure of the Strait of Hormuz on February 28, 2026. The June 17 memorandum that briefly reopened the strait expired on August 17 with no successor; on September 25 Iran tabled a seven-day plan that would reopen the strait after the US lifts its blockade and sanctions, which Washington has not accepted. Status categories follow the GEF threshold framework: offline / destroyed indicates a pipeline that is not transporting volumes; disrupted indicates reduced flow or repeated incidents; reduced indicates flowing below contracted or nameplate capacity; active indicates flowing within normal range.
Saudi East-West Petroline (Petroline)
The 1,200km pipeline carrying Saudi crude from the Abqaiq processing area to the Red Sea terminal at Yanbu, bypassing the Strait of Hormuz. It is the single most important Hormuz bypass, with about 7m b/d of capacity. Drone strikes by Iraqi militias shut it on 10–11 September; it restarted on 22 September at a low rate and, by 28 September, was carrying about 3.5m b/d, with Aramco targeting 4m b/d and full capacity first put at four to eight weeks. Kpler’s analysis is that the pipe itself took limited damage while at least one pumping station was heavily damaged and is running on temporary bypasses. Reuters reported on 24 and 25 September that loadings at Yanbu had not yet resumed; tanker loadings have since resumed, confirmed by satellite imagery, at roughly half of the 4–4.5m b/d exported before the attack, and GEF withdrew its earlier ‘disputed’ label on 29 September; Lloyd’s List reports Red Sea tanker loadings rising as Aramco ramps pipeline contingency into October. War-risk cover for Saudi-linked tankers at Yanbu has tripled to about 3% of hull value. While the line was down, Saudi crude moved through Hormuz itself and by ship-to-ship transfer off Sohar, Oman. On 24 September Saudi Arabia intercepted six Houthi ballistic missiles aimed at Taif and the Yanbu area, and France announced it will send soldiers, radars and air-defence systems to protect Yanbu. The bypass now leads from one contested chokepoint to another: crude loaded at Yanbu for Asia must pass Bab el-Mandeb.
Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP)
The 1.5 mb/d pipeline carrying UAE crude from the Habshan field complex to the Fujairah terminal on the Gulf of Oman — bypassing Hormuz on the UAE side. ADCOP was the second-largest Hormuz bypass route until the May 4, 2026 drone attack on the Fujairah Oil Industry Zone, which set fire to VTTI tank-farm facilities (jointly owned by Vitol, IFM and TAQA) and damaged the eastern terminus. The pipeline itself remained intact; subsequent UAE missile and drone barrages on May 5, 7 and 8 were intercepted by air defences. Throughput has been recovering and the IEA puts UAE total exports near 85% of pre-war. Specific repair status at the VTTI terminus has not been independently re-confirmed since May. Habshan (the gas-processing complex co-located at the ADCOP origin) was hit twice in March-April with one fatality from debris on Apr 3.
Druzhba (Friendship) Pipeline
The Soviet-era pipeline system carrying Russian and Kazakh crude into Central and Eastern Europe is technically a crude-oil pipeline rather than gas, but its disruption status affects European refining economics that downstream affect gas demand for power generation. The southern leg to Hungary and Slovakia restarted on April 22, 2026 (Day 53) after an 87-day outage following a Russian drone strike on the Ukrainian section in late January; the EU €90bn Ukraine loan was unblocked the same week. The northern leg supplying PCK Schwedt refinery in Brandenburg, Germany has been halted since May 1, 2026 (Day 172 today) after Russia confirmed it would stop transit of Kazakh crude through the route — PCK Schwedt has lost approximately 17% of its feedstock (~40,000-43,000 barrels per day), with diversification underway via Rostock, Gdansk and BTC. Berlin-Brandenburg retail fuel availability is on watch. Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic continue to receive volumes via the restored southern leg.
CPC (Caspian Pipeline Consortium)
The 1.4 mb/d pipeline carrying Kazakh crude from the Tengiz field across southern Russia to the Novorossiysk port terminal on the Black Sea. CPC carries approximately 80% of Kazakhstan's crude exports and approximately 1% of global oil supply. An April 6, 2026 Ukrainian drone attack damaged the Novorossiysk loading facilities — single-point mooring (SPM-2), berth and four storage tanks set on fire — reducing operational capacity to approximately 65%; Tengizchevroil declared force majeure on CPC Blend. A second Ukrainian drone attack hit the Novorossiysk terminal in the early hours of May 24, further straining capacity. KazTransOil reduced oil exports in May via two routes (PortSEurope Jun 14). Kazakh crude has redirected via BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) and other alternative routes, but full substitution at scale is not possible in the near term.
Russian refining (drone-strike track)
Latest (Reuters, 15 September): Kinef is shut and Volgograd and NORSI are running at about 25% of capacity — three of the six plants that make roughly half of Russia’s diesel. The background: Ukraine's long-range drone campaign against Russian refineries has materially escalated through Q2 2026 and is now the single most important pipeline-adjacent crude-oil story alongside the Hormuz dynamics. The Gazprom Neft Moscow Oil Refinery in the Kapotnya district (~40% of the capital's gasoline supply, ~50% of its diesel) was struck on June 16 and again on June 18 in the largest drone attack on Moscow of the war (194+ drones intercepted that morning per Mayor Sobyanin; ~1,000 across Russia). Both primary refining units were disabled and the facility is unlikely to resume operations before 2027 per Reuters Jun 24. Strikes on central-Russia refineries (Kirishi, Ryazan, NORSI, YANOS, Syzran) have cut national gasoline output approximately 25% year-on-year, driving 56-region rationing, a 6.6% YTD pump-price rise, and Deputy PM Novak weighing a full diesel-export ban. Putin personally acknowledged the crisis on Sun Jun 28 and stood up a new task force. This is a Ukraine-war track, distinct from Hormuz.
Other monitored routes
The site tracks flow status of additional major routes including the East-Siberian-Pacific-Ocean (ESPO) pipeline carrying Russian crude to Asian markets, the BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) pipeline through the Caucasus carrying Azerbaijani crude with ramping Kazakh re-routing (1.6M tonnes/yr 2026 up from 1.3M 2025), the Iraq-Turkey (Kirkuk-Ceyhan) pipeline which remains reduced from security incidents and the unresolved 2023 arbitration ruling, the Iran Goreh-Jask Hormuz bypass (operational at low throughput, feedstock constrained by South Pars damage), the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), the Keystone system and other North American infrastructure, and crude pipeline interconnections supporting the US Gulf Coast refining cluster. Atlantic Basin crude exports rose +3.5 mb/d since February toward East-of-Suez markets (US, Brazil, Canada, Kazakhstan, Venezuela leading) — that redirection should partly normalize as Gulf flow returns. The full disruption map and incident feed above reflect the current operational status of all monitored routes.
Why this matters
Pipelines were meant to be the part of the oil system that routes around a closed strait. This month showed their limits. The East–West line went down to drone strikes, came back at a fraction of capacity, and its Red Sea terminal became a missile target within two days of the restart; the ADCOP route to Fujairah has run below capacity since May; and the Druzhba northern leg has been halted since 1 May. Brent swung between $99.25 and $106.60 in the week to 25 September and settled at $104.32, then $105.28 on 28 September and $102.25 on 2 October (after a $4.28 Thursday rally reversed by the G7 100 Mbbl release), tracking diplomacy and missile strikes more than any change in flows. A disruption at one node propagates through the entire system, and a bypass is only as secure as the chokepoint it leads to.