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Marine Traffic Chokepoints

Maritime Chokepoints — Live Flow Status & Risk Tracker

Five monitored maritime chokepoints — flow status, risk ratings and disruption analysis

Critical
Watch / Elevated
Normal
Chokepoint Status Oct 19
Strait of Hormuz
CRITICAL · Day 233 · UKMTO: 23 attacks since 1 Oct, tanker hit by an RPG off Jubail 17 Oct · GFS Pride sunk 14 Oct · Iran says the strait stays closed · board HOLDS at Critical
Bab el-Mandeb
CRITICAL · Day 233 · Saudi–Houthi strikes continue (Najran hit 18 Oct; drones intercepted over Riyadh 17 Oct; Yanbu missile intercepted 16 Oct) · Yanbu loadings rising (Lloyd’s List) · GEF AIS Oct 19: moving traffic in both lanes
Suez Canal
WATCH · Day 233 · GEF AIS Oct 19: dense two-way traffic with a canal convoy, normal pattern
Strait of Malacca
ELEVATED · GEF AIS Oct 19: very dense along the strait and at Singapore/Johor, no disruption signature
Panama Canal
OK · GEF AIS Oct 19: orderly at both approaches, moving traffic north and south of the canal
Tanker Clusters
Red Sea / Yanbu
East–West pipeline carrying crude at reduced rates; Yanbu loading at roughly half of pre-attack rates on GEF’s last confirmed read (28 Sep). Lloyd’s List reports Red Sea tanker loadings rising as Aramco ramps pipeline contingency. The Houthis have escalated against Saudi Arabia: the 10 October missile strike on Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport now stands at 13 killed and about 300 injured, the Saudi-led coalition struck Sanaa and other sites in western Yemen on 13 October, and a Houthi ballistic missile hit the Aramco complex in Dhahran that night (ministry: limited fire, no injuries; a company source: top three floors of an office tower damaged); its energy minister says the kingdom is developing additional pipelines beyond the East–West line. Houthi claims of strikes on Aramco and eastern oil and gas facilities are unverified and not published. On 16 October the Saudi-led coalition intercepted a ballistic missile aimed at Yanbu (initial reports: no damage at the port), two cruise missiles over the Red Sea and three drones; at least 19 people have been killed in more than a week of Houthi attacks on Saudi targets (CBS) and Riyadh airport is suspended through 17 October (US Mission advisory). GEF AIS Oct 19: moving traffic in both lanes at the Bab el-Mandeb approaches, no satellite-only label in the frame. Since then a Houthi projectile hit a residential area of Najran (18 Oct, 6 injured) and the coalition says it intercepted four drones over Riyadh and other regions (17 Oct).
Persian Gulf / Hormuz core
UKMTO counts at least 10 vessel attacks in or near the strait since 11 October and 23 since 1 October, nearly double the usual rate; a tanker was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade about 78 nm NE of Jubail on 17 October, the IRGC claims an unverified mine strike on an unnamed supertanker, and a tugboat was reportedly struck on 18 October (CBS, single source). UKMTO said October is the busiest month since March (10 attacks in the week to 16 October, one ship sunk) and a tanker was struck off Al Jubail, Saudi Arabia on 16 October. At least thirteen vessels struck since 1 October by GEF’s count (Kazimah III, Uhud, Lipsi, inbound drone strike, On Peace on 6 Oct, Acers on 7 Oct off Qatar, the laden VLCC GEM NO.2 on 9 Oct off the UAE, Valthera on 10 Oct and Angola Prosperity on 11 Oct, then GFS Pride (sunk), GFS Giselle, Al Saadiyat and Alfonso on 13 October), UKMTO logged six ships struck on 11 Oct (five in the strait, one drone strike at Sohar, Oman), an outbound tanker was hit by a projectile on 10 Oct (UKMTO; fire, crew safe) and a tanker fire in Gulf waters from which the UAE National Guard rescued 22 crew; the IMO counted nine ships hit 1-6 Oct alone (USNI). A US jet disabled the blockade runner Ocean Molica in the Gulf of Oman on 10 Oct. Iranian coastal cluster at Bandar Abbas and Qeshm, no satellite-only label in frame (GEF AIS Oct 19). IMF PortWatch: 4 vessels on 4 Oct against a typical 85 (AIS only, ~3 days behind).
Singapore / Johor
Very dense and normal on the Oct 19 frame — the destination for much of the crude that clears Hormuz.
Why It Matters
These five chokepoints carry the bulk of seaborne energy, and this week showed how the pressure moves between them. Saudi Arabia restarted the East–West pipeline on 22 September to route crude around Hormuz to Yanbu on the Red Sea — and on 24 September the Houthis fired missiles at Yanbu itself. Yanbu is now loading again at roughly half of pre-attack rates and Lloyd's List reports Red Sea tanker loadings rising as Aramco ramps pipeline contingency. Hormuz itself absorbed four tanker strikes on 1-4 October (Kazimah III, Uhud, Lipsi, drone-funnel), interrupting a recovery that had seen 119 transits in the week to 30 September. A bypass is only as safe as the next chokepoint it leads to.
Data Note
Chokepoint flow estimates compiled from Kpler, IMF PortWatch, UKMTO, IEA and GEF AIS analysis. Live vessel positions on the Live Traffic tab are provided by MarineTraffic. Some vessels may not broadcast AIS for commercial or security reasons.

About maritime chokepoints

Five narrow waterways together carry the majority of seaborne crude oil, refined petroleum products and liquefied natural gas trade globally. Disruption at any one of them rapidly translates into supply tightness in downstream markets. This page tracks operational flow status and risk ratings at each chokepoint, derived from a combination of AIS vessel tracking, government and operator filings, and verified incident reports.

Strait of Hormuz

The narrow waterway between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula, connecting the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and onward to the Indian Ocean. Hormuz has historically carried approximately 20% of global oil and a substantial share of refined-product and LNG trade — Qatar's entire LNG export portfolio transits the strait, along with the bulk of crude oil from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, the UAE and Iran itself. Since February 28, 2026 the strait has been severely restricted. Updated 19 October (Day 233): UKMTO counts at least 10 vessel attacks in or near the strait since 11 October and 23 since 1 October, nearly double the usual rate, and warns the true count is higher because most ships no longer report. On 17 October a tanker was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade fired from a small boat about 78 nautical miles north-east of Jubail, Saudi Arabia, damaging its aft port quarter; the IRGC says a supertanker carrying about two million barrels hit a mine and caught fire, which is unverified and unnamed, while CENTCOM says it has cleared the strait of mines and that ships are being hit by projectiles. On 18 October a tugboat was reportedly struck by two unknown projectiles with one minor casualty (CBS, single source). On 16 October a tanker was struck about 68 nautical miles north-east of Al Jubail, and the Singapore-flagged container ship GFS Pride sank on 14 October after a projectile strike (all 21 crew rescued). At least thirteen vessels have been struck since 1 October by GEF’s count, a floor rather than a total: the Kuwaiti VLCC Kazimah III, the Panama-flagged Uhud, Lipsi, an inbound vessel hit by a drone, On Peace (6 October, 12 crew injured), Acers (7 October, off Qatar), the laden VLCC GEM NO.2 (9 October, off the UAE), Valthera (10 October) and Angola Prosperity (11 October), then GFS Pride, GFS Giselle, Al Saadiyat and Alfonso on 13 October. Iranian claims of further nightly strikes are unverified and not counted, and CENTCOM’s figure of about 400 commercial transits and 100 million barrels in a week cannot be verified by GEF; Kpler has 11.6 mb/d in the seven days to 13 October, about 68% of the pre-war baseline. GEF’s 19 October audit of the Bandar Abbas and Qeshm frame returns the Iranian coastal cluster with no satellite-only contact in the corridor where the strikes took place. Diplomacy is deadlocked: Foreign Minister Araghchi said on 18 October that Tehran is still reviewing US comments on its seven-day plan and that the strait would reopen on day six if the US lifts its blockade and oil sanctions and agrees a ceasefire on all fronts, while the US blockade of Iranian ports remains in force. Elsewhere the picture is normal or improving: named traffic (RAVELIN, JOROPO, DISCOVERY, ASP SERENE, MITZEL, ZEVEN, KOMANDER) is moving through the Bab el-Mandeb approaches in both lanes, Suez traffic is dense in both directions with a canal convoy, Malacca is very dense along the strait and at Singapore/Johor and Panama is orderly at both approaches, with no disruption signature on the 19 October frames. The Saudi–Houthi exchange is now aimed at the bypass and Saudi territory: on 16 October a Saudi-led coalition intercepted a ballistic missile aimed at Yanbu, the Red Sea port Saudi Arabia uses around Hormuz; on 17 October it said it intercepted four drones over Riyadh and other regions; and on 18 October a Houthi projectile hit a residential area of Najran (six injured) while the Kingdom Centre in Riyadh told tenants to work remotely.

Bab el-Mandeb

The southern entrance to the Red Sea, between Yemen, Djibouti and Eritrea. Bab el-Mandeb carries approximately 10–12% of global seaborne crude trade under normal conditions and is the only maritime route between the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean. The chokepoint has been under intermittent attack risk from Houthi maritime forces since late 2023; many vessels now transit with AIS transponders dark for operational security, complicating accurate vessel counts. Direct tanker strikes began in late July, and the Saudi–Houthi exchange has escalated into September as Houthi forces advance along the coast. On 24 September Saudi Arabia intercepted six Houthi ballistic missiles aimed at Taif and the Yanbu area — the Red Sea terminal fed by the East–West pipeline that restarted on 22 September. Lloyd's List reports Red Sea tanker loadings rising as Aramco ramps pipeline contingency; GEF's last confirmed throughput reading was ~3.5m b/d on 28 September. GEF's AIS audit on 5 October shows named traffic in the narrows and six to seven satellite-only contacts, inside the 3–12 band tracked since August; there is no confirmed closure of the strait itself, and traffic unwilling to take the risk still routes around the Cape of Good Hope.

Suez Canal

The man-made waterway connecting the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, operated by Egypt's Suez Canal Authority. Suez itself has not been physically constrained in 2026 — the binding constraint upstream is willingness to transit Bab el-Mandeb given the Houthi threat. Roughly 12% of global trade continues to route through Suez despite the risk; Egypt has offered discounted tolls to larger vessels to help retain traffic, and lost an estimated $7 billion in canal revenue in 2024 alone to Houthi-driven rerouting. The EIA’s September outlook records Saudi Arabia routing more crude through Suez, and with the East–West pipeline restarted on 22 September traders are positioning tankers at Port Said and Sidi Kerir for rising Yanbu loadings. GEF's AIS audit on 5 October shows convoys under way in both directions, a northbound queue at Suez and Port Said, busy Port Said and Alexandria anchorages, and IKARIOTIKOS/PUSAKA MALAKA near Aqaba. The expected rise in Saudi volume now depends on Yanbu loadings building beyond roughly half of pre-attack rates, which needs the pumping-station repairs and continued air defence.

Strait of Malacca

The principal east-west chokepoint between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, running between Indonesia and Malaysia. Malacca carries approximately 25-30% of global seaborne trade by volume and is the primary route for Middle Eastern crude moving to Chinese, Korean, Japanese and Southeast Asian refining centres. As Hormuz-bound cargoes have rerouted, Malacca traffic has materially densified — GEF’s AIS check on 25 September around the Singapore Strait approach showed one of the densest concentrations of shipping anywhere in the world, with concentrated holding patterns near Singapore and Johor Bahru. The chokepoint is not currently under direct security threat, but the capacity headroom remains thin.

Panama Canal

The lock-based canal between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, operated by the Panama Canal Authority (ACP). Panama is a relatively minor chokepoint for crude oil but a significant route for LNG carriers serving Asian markets from US Gulf Coast terminals (though LNG transits remain roughly 73% below pre-drought levels, with carriers still preferring the Cape of Good Hope route even post-recovery). The 2023-24 drought that cut daily transits to as low as 18 vessels is fully resolved: Gatun and Alajuela Lakes sit at historically high levels, full 50-foot draft has been restored, and the ACP does not forecast transit restrictions through December 31, 2026 — though it is monitoring a possible El Niño-driven tightening in 2027. Auction prices for non-reserved transit slots remain sharply elevated versus pre-drought levels. GEF’s AIS check on 25 September showed orderly vessel groups at both approaches near the Panama City/canal approach, consistent with orderly operations.

How to interpret this data

Chokepoint flow estimates are not precise vessel counts — they aggregate AIS observations, port-state inspection records, satellite imagery review, operator filings and inter-agency intelligence. Some vessels do not broadcast AIS for commercial reasons (sanctions compliance, route confidentiality) or for security reasons (Bab el-Mandeb transit avoidance). Where AIS is suppressed, vessel counts are inferred from satellite imagery and port-call records and explicitly flagged in the data note. For live position data on individual vessels see the live traffic map. For the broader supply consequences of chokepoint disruption see the main dashboard and weekly risk analysis briefing.