Live Tanker Traffic — Global AIS Map

What the map is showing today

On Day 234 of the Strait of Hormuz crisis, UKMTO counts at least 10 vessel attacks in or near the strait since 11 October and 23 since 1 October, nearly double the usual rate, and warns the true count is higher because most ships no longer report; its latest weekly assessment counts 12 attacks (10 in the Hormuz area) and about 254 transits in a week, roughly 70% below pre-war. On 17 October a tanker was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade fired from a small boat about 78 nautical miles north-east of Jubail, Saudi Arabia, damaging its aft port quarter; the IRGC says a supertanker carrying about two million barrels hit a mine and caught fire, which is unverified and unnamed, while CENTCOM says it has cleared the strait of mines and that ships are being hit by projectiles. On 18 October a tug about 20 nautical miles north-east of Khor Fakkan was struck by two unidentified projectiles with one minor injury (UKMTO), and JMIC says there is no substantiation for the IRGC’s mine claims. On 16 October a tanker was struck about 68 nautical miles north-east of Al Jubail, and the Singapore-flagged container ship GFS Pride sank on 14 October after a projectile strike (all 21 crew rescued). At least thirteen vessels have been struck since 1 October by GEF’s count, a floor rather than a total: the Kuwaiti VLCC Kazimah III, the Panama-flagged Uhud, Lipsi, an inbound vessel hit by a drone, On Peace (6 October, 12 crew injured), Acers (7 October, off Qatar), the laden VLCC GEM NO.2 (9 October, off the UAE), Valthera (10 October) and Angola Prosperity (11 October), then GFS Pride, GFS Giselle, Al Saadiyat and Alfonso on 13 October. Iranian claims of further nightly strikes are unverified and not counted, and CENTCOM’s figure of about 400 commercial transits and 100 million barrels in a week cannot be verified by GEF; Kpler has 11.6 mb/d in the seven days to 13 October, about 68% of the pre-war baseline. GEF’s 20 October audit of the Bandar Abbas and Qeshm frame returns the Iranian coastal cluster with no satellite-only contact in the corridor where the strikes took place. Diplomacy is deadlocked: on 20 October spokesman Baghaei said Iran will leave no attack unanswered and is not negotiating on the nuclear issue, and Foreign Minister Araghchi said on 18 October that Tehran is still reviewing US comments on its seven-day plan and that the strait would reopen on day six if the US lifts its blockade and oil sanctions and agrees a ceasefire on all fronts, while the US blockade of Iranian ports remains in force. Elsewhere the picture is normal or improving: named traffic (RAVELIN, JOROPO, EGRET, OSANA, GOLD TIDE, PAZ, BOBCAT) is moving through the Bab el-Mandeb approaches in both lanes, with about four satellite-only contacts in a wide frame, Suez traffic is dense in both directions with a canal convoy, Malacca is very dense along the strait and at Singapore/Johor and Panama is orderly at both approaches, with no disruption signature on the 20 October frames. The Saudi–Houthi exchange is now aimed at the bypass and Saudi territory: on 16 October a Saudi-led coalition intercepted a ballistic missile aimed at Yanbu, the Red Sea port Saudi Arabia uses around Hormuz; on 17 October it said it intercepted four drones over Riyadh and other regions; on 18 October a Houthi projectile hit a residential area of Najran (six injured) while the Kingdom Centre in Riyadh told tenants to work remotely; and on 19 October the Houthis claimed strikes on Riyadh airport and Aramco sites at Yanbu and Shaybah, which Saudi authorities did not confirm and Reuters could not verify.

Read every vessel count here as a floor, not a total. Kpler data reported via CNN found 72 of 84 crude-laden tankers (86%) transiting since 7 July sailed with AIS switched off, most via the UN-authorised Omani corridor and frequently using ship-to-ship transfers. US Energy Secretary Chris Wright has argued flows are higher than tracking services capture, and GEF accepts that as a fair caveat — applied consistently it means an AIS map understates traffic in exactly the conditions where traffic matters most.

Two further distortions are worth knowing. CNN reports GPS spoofing as an ongoing problem around both Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, which corrupts position data rather than removing it. And a share of contacts appear as [SAT-AIS] — visible to satellite receivers but not terrestrial ones. GEF logs that count each morning: it has run between three and roughly twelve at Bab el-Mandeb over the past week, and a single day’s move in either direction is recorded but not interpreted, because one morning is not a trend.

Why it matters: a live map is evidence, not truth. Where operators have an incentive to be unobserved, absence of signal is itself the signal — and the honest use of this page is to read it alongside the transit counts and dated sources on the Hormuz tracker, not instead of them.

About this map

The map above shows live AIS (Automatic Identification System) positions of tankers, LNG carriers and energy-related shipping worldwide, embedded from MarineTraffic. AIS is the maritime equivalent of aviation transponders: vessels broadcast their identity, position, course and speed to nearby ships and shore stations. The MarineTraffic platform aggregates this data into a near-live picture of global commercial shipping. Positions are indicative rather than precisely real-time; refresh frequency varies by vessel class, region and AIS coverage density.

Energy shipping is concentrated in a handful of strategically critical chokepoints. Five chokepoints together carry the majority of seaborne crude oil, refined product and liquefied natural gas trade. Understanding the live AIS picture at these chokepoints is one of the highest-signal indicators of energy-supply disruption, because tanker behaviour responds to operational risk faster than any other observable variable: tankers slow, divert, anchor offshore, or accelerate into safe waters within hours of geopolitical events.

Strait of Hormuz

The narrow waterway between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula has historically carried approximately 20% of global oil and a substantial share of refined-product and LNG trade. Since February 28, 2026 traffic has run far below the pre-war baseline of roughly 130 transits a day. Kpler counted three on 17 September, the lowest of the war. Barrel estimates diverge widely: independent trackers put flows at 3.7–8m b/d, while US official statements imply up to about 16.4m b/d. Much of the traffic that does move runs with AIS switched off or via ship-to-ship transfers in the Gulf of Oman, so this map understates it. For the day count, dated sources and full timeline, see the Hormuz tracker.

Bab el-Mandeb (Red Sea / Suez Canal)

The southern entrance to the Red Sea, between Yemen and Djibouti, has been under intermittent attack risk from Houthi maritime forces since late 2023. As Hormuz-bound traffic has rerouted, Bab el-Mandeb has absorbed displaced European-bound flows, with vessel densities in the Red Sea and at the Suez Canal northbound queue running above pre-2026 norms. The Suez Canal itself, while a fixed-width waterway, has not been a binding constraint in 2026; the binding constraint upstream remains willingness of operators to transit Bab el-Mandeb. The Saudi East–West pipeline restarted on 22 September to feed Yanbu on the Red Sea and carried about 3.5m b/d on 28 September, with Yanbu loading again at roughly half of pre-attack rates, after the Houthis fired missiles at the Yanbu area on 24 September; Houthi forces also continue to advance along the Yemeni coast.

Strait of Malacca / Singapore Strait

The principal east-west chokepoint between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, carrying the majority of seaborne crude moving from the Middle East and Africa to East Asian refining centres. Malacca has densified materially since February 28, 2026 as the redirection of cargoes that previously transited Hormuz adds traffic load. Singapore's anchorage areas show elevated holding patterns. Indonesian and Malaysian patrol activity remains routine; no acute security risk at the chokepoint itself.

Panama Canal

The lock-based canal between the Atlantic and Pacific is constrained by water-level seasonality rather than geopolitical risk. The 2024-2025 water level recovery has held into 2026, with normal transit slot allocations restored. Panama is a relatively minor chokepoint for crude oil — most movements are LNG carriers serving Asian markets from US Gulf Coast terminals.

Turkish Straits (Bosphorus and Dardanelles)

The narrow waterways connecting the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, regulated under the Montreux Convention. Russian crude exports through the Black Sea (including Novorossiysk port flows) transit the Bosphorus southbound; the post-April 6 CPC attack reduced Novorossiysk capacity to approximately 65%. Turkish authorities have not invoked Montreux restrictions during the current cycle.

How to read the map

Vessel symbols on the map are colour-coded by ship class: tankers, gas carriers, cargo ships, passenger vessels and others. Click a vessel to see its name, IMO number, destination and ETA. For chokepoint-specific analysis with vessel counts and disruption indicators, see the chokepoints page. For the wider energy supply context that this maritime picture sits inside, see the main dashboard and the weekly risk analysis briefing.

The MarineTraffic embed is a third-party service; positions are indicative and may lag actual vessel movements by several minutes to several hours depending on AIS coverage. For operational maritime decisions, vessels and operators should rely on their own AIS receivers and authoritative naval coordination bodies (UKMTO, Combined Maritime Forces, IMO). Nothing on this page is a navigation aid.