EU Petrol & Diesel Availability — 2026 Two-Scenario Forecast

Reading the chart. The two solid lines show what has actually happened to European petrol and diesel availability since January: both sat at full pre-crisis supply until the Strait of Hormuz closed on February 28, then slipped through spring as Hungary introduced a price cap (Mar 9) and Slovenia became the first EU country to ration road fuel (Mar 23). By June 23, diesel sits near 87% and petrol near 89% of normal — improving as the US-Iran deal (signed Jun 17, reopening began Jun 18) unwinds the crude premium, Hungary cap dissolves (market prices below cap level), and Brent settles $78.2. The two dashed pairs reflect the post-deal world: deal-and-recovery is the base case and full re-escalation the low-probability tail.

Scenario 1Deal-and-recovery — the base case (~60%). The US-Iran deal was signed June 17 and the physical reopening began June 18; this is now the active path. Availability dips shallowly into midsummer — Gulf cargoes take roughly two months to reach European refineries and forecourts, August jet-fuel demand is about 40% higher than March, and the EU's June 17 ban on short-term Russian pipeline gas contracts (now in force) weighs on diesel via gas-to-power substitution — before recovering from September as cargoes arrive. By December, petrol reaches ~96% and diesel ~92% of normal. The gap from a clean 100% is the permanent Russian pipeline-gas loss, plus the reality that ADNOC's chief executive has said full Middle East flow recovery is unlikely before late 2027. The key variable on this path is whether the uranium enrichment impasse at the Bürgenstock talks (concluded Jun 23) eventually derails the deal or holds.

Scenario 2Re-escalation tail — dual chokepoint + Russia pre-emption (~15%). The low-probability path now that a deal has been reached: the interim agreement collapses and Iran extends closure to Bab el-Mandeb (ORF Middle East estimates a simultaneous Hormuz + Bab el-Mandeb disruption puts ~25% of global oil and gas and ~30% of container shipping at risk, ~$10B/day in trade); Cape of Good Hope reroutes add 12–15 days and ~$1M per voyage. On top of that, Moscow pre-empts the EU's June 17 ban by suspending TurkStream and Tengiz-Novorossiysk flows (officially blamed on Ukrainian drone damage) and redirecting remaining oil and product volumes to higher-paying Asian buyers. Inventory depletion compounds: IEA-flagged commercial cover already measured in weeks, ARA distillate stocks below the five-year average, and winter heating from October competes directly with transport diesel. Diesel degrades faster than petrol because it is more exposed to both the lost Gulf and Russian flows and the heating-season pull. By December, diesel falls to ~50% and petrol to ~58% of normal — the level at which rationing-type controls spread well beyond Slovenia and Hungary into a wider cluster of member states, and the IEA's "largest energy crisis we have ever faced" framing becomes operational.

Russia factorWhy Russia bends both lines. Russia is now a smaller direct supplier to Europe than before 2022 — Russian crude is already under 3% of EU oil imports and pipeline gas/LNG down to roughly 13% — so this is not a 2022-style dependency shock. But two things still move the curves: first, the EU's own scheduled ban on Russian short-term pipeline gas contracts takes effect June 17, 2026 (15 days from this model) — removing residual supply in both scenarios and tightening diesel through gas-to-power substitution; second, Moscow has signalled it may pre-empt the bans by suspending TurkStream and Tengiz-Novorossiysk (officially blamed on Ukrainian drone damage) and redirecting remaining oil and product volumes to higher-paying Asian buyers, which would pull that loss forward and deepen the downside in Scenario 2. The effect is diesel-weighted — petrol is only lightly exposed to the gas bans directly — and it is the reason Scenario 1 settles near 83–90% rather than a clean 100%.

MethodThis is a scenario forecast, not a prediction. The observed Jan–Jun line is built from confirmed government measures and import-flow data; the Jun–Dec branches are illustrative model paths, not guarantees, and the real outcome will depend on the pace of any diplomatic settlement, winter severity, refinery uptime, whether Iran follows through on its Bab el-Mandeb threat, and whether Russia pre-empts the EU's import bans. Model re-weighted June 16 after the US-Iran interim deal was reached (due to sign June 19 in Switzerland; toll-free Hormuz reopening + end of the US naval blockade) — with crude back near $83 even as the strait remains physically shut pending the signing. Sources: GIE AGSI+, IEA Oil Market Report (May 2026), IEA Birol public statements (Apr–Jun), Cirium/ICIS Europe jet deficit estimates, ADNOC, ORF Middle East (dual-chokepoint impact), EU REPowerEU phase-out regulation (Russian gas ban dates), Council of the EU, national energy regulators and government decrees, TradingEconomics / Investing.com / Fortune (crude June 1-2). Per-disruption detail and the live EU shortage map at global-energy-flow.com/shortages/eu/.