EU Petrol & Diesel Availability — 2026 Three-Scenario Forecast
Actual January–July 14 (held flat through August 16, no fresher EU-wide print) plus three scenarios to year-end. Sustained standoff is the base case, with de-escalation and escalation as the two tails. The EU's June 17 ban on Russian pipeline gas weighs on diesel via power generation in all three. As of the last confirmed read: diesel ~86%, petrol ~89% of normal supply.
European petrol & diesel availability in 2026: actual to July 17, plus three revised forecasts to year-end
Index where 100% = normal pre-crisis road-fuel supply (early Feb 2026). Below ~90% = visible tightness and price-cap measures; below ~80% = rationing-type controls spread. Solid lines are observed Jan–Jul 31; dashed lines are three modelled scenarios for the rest of 2026, held at no material change to the observed level (no fresh EU-wide road-fuel print has landed in several weeks, despite an extremely eventful stretch). Both the base case and both tails include the EU's June 17 ban on Russian pipeline gas (in force), which weighs on diesel via power generation regardless of the Hormuz outcome. UPDATE Aug 10: EU gas storage has continued improving, now at 57.15% (GIE AGSI+ direct read, Aug 2) — the second consecutive on-pace reading, projecting to land at or slightly above the relaxed 80% Nov 1 target for the first time this cycle, a genuine positive signal this page's scenario weights do not yet fully capture. Working against that: this has been the most volatile week yet on the Hormuz diplomatic front -- an Iran-Oman route understanding, undercut by stricter-than-expected parliamentary terms and a hardened Iranian weekend stance ("no ongoing negotiations" with Washington), plus contested incidents at Qeshm Island, Khasab, and three ADNOC vessels attacked. On balance, these keep the base case (sustained standoff) as the operative read rather than shifting decisively toward either tail.
One data point = the estimated share of normal petrol/diesel volume reaching European forecourts, aggregated across EU member states + UK from confirmed national measures (rationing, price caps, refinery feedstock cuts) and import-flow data. Hungary's foreign-plate price cap was abolished Jun 26, 2026 after market prices fell below the regulated level — see the EU status page. Slovenia's road-fuel rationing decree remains removed from GEF's tracker (no fresh evidence of re-activation).
Where each fuel lands by December 31, 2026 (de-escalation → base case → escalation tail)
Today (Jul 31) — observed, held flat since mid-July
86–89%
Diesel ~86% · petrol ~89%, unchanged from the Jul 14 read — no fresh EU-wide print in the 3 days since, so this rebuild carries the observed level forward rather than fabricate movement. Two developments since Jul 14 reinforce rather than shift the base case: a contested Basra tanker drone-hit Jul 16 (Iraq, status disputed) and Russia's Jul 8 ban on ALL diesel exports (its refining capacity cut ~25% by Ukrainian drone strikes) — Europe hasn't imported Russian diesel directly since 2023, but the ban tightens the global diesel pool Europe competes in. Brent trading ~$85 today, holding most of this week's gains.
Scenario 1 — De-escalation
92–96%
OPTIMISTIC CASE (~25%, demoted from the prior 65% base case). The US blockade lifts, the transit toll is dropped, Brent eases back. Supply recovers as Gulf cargoes arrive — petrol ~96%, diesel ~92% by December. Held just below 100% by the permanent Russian pipeline-gas loss (June 17 ban).
Scenario 2 — Sustained standoff
75–82%
BASE CASE (~50%). Brief pauses keep breaking into fresh kinetic events -- this week's direct US strike on Iran is exactly that pattern -- without a decisive resolution either way; Gulf cargoes keep arriving but at reduced, costlier volumes. Petrol drifts to ~82%, diesel to ~75% by December — entering the rationing-risk zone. Russia's ongoing ban on diesel exports (its own refining capacity still impaired from Ukrainian drone strikes) continues tightening the global pool Europe competes in for non-Russian barrels.
Scenario 3 — Escalation tail
48–58%
TAIL RISK (~25%, up from 10%). A further kinetic cycle opens a new front (Bab el-Mandeb, or a Kharg Island strike) and Russia redirects volumes to Asia rather than complying with the June 17 ban. Diesel ~48% · petrol ~58% by December — worse than the prior model's 52%/61%, reflecting the demonstrated pattern of repeated re-escalation.
JanFebMarAprMayJunJulAugSepOctNovDec
Petrol — observed
Diesel — observed
Scenario 1: Deal-and-recovery (base case)
Scenario 2: Re-escalation tail (dual chokepoint + Russia cut)
Forecast model · GEF supply-chain analysis · observed Jan–Jul 31 from confirmed national measures + import-flow data · scenarios are illustrative, not guarantees · rebuilt Jul 31 (no material change to the observed level; the direct US strike on Iran and the Damietta drone strike near Suez folded in as reinforcing context for the escalation tail)global-energy-flow.com · July 17, 2026
Reading the chart. The two solid lines show what has actually happened to European petrol and diesel availability since January: both sat at full pre-crisis supply until the Strait of Hormuz closed on February 28, then slipped through spring as Hungary introduced a price cap (Mar 9) and other national measures compounded the pressure. Availability improved through late June as the Jun 17 Islamabad Memorandum and Jun 30 Doha coordination talks unwound the crude premium — reaching petrol 90%/diesel 88% by July 1 — but the MoU broke down the week of July 7: three vessels were struck near Oman, the US struck Iran three consecutive nights, and by July 14 the US Navy had reimposed its Hormuz blockade and announced a new 20% transit toll. Availability has dipped again, to petrol 89%/diesel 86% as of July 14. GEF has revised the three dashed scenarios accordingly: a sustained standoff is now the base case rather than continued recovery, and the escalation tail has both grown in probability and deepened in severity.
Scenario 1De-escalation — the optimistic case (~25%, demoted from the prior 65% base case). The June 17 Islamabad Memorandum, which broke down the week of July 7, is renegotiated or a new arrangement takes hold; the US Navy stands down its reimposed blockade; the 20% transit toll is dropped or unenforced. Availability recovers as Gulf cargoes arrive — Gulf cargoes take roughly two months to reach European refineries and forecourts, August jet-fuel demand is about 40% higher than March, and the EU's June 17 ban on short-term Russian pipeline gas contracts (in force) weighs on diesel via gas-to-power substitution regardless. By December, petrol reaches ~96% and diesel ~92% of normal. The gap from a clean 100% is the permanent Russian pipeline-gas loss, plus the reality that ADNOC's chief executive has said full Middle East flow recovery is unlikely before late 2027. This was the base case as of the Jul 1 model; the events of Jul 7-14 have moved it to the optimistic tail.
Scenario 2Sustained standoff — the NEW BASE CASE (~50%, up from 30% in the prior model). The pattern of the last two weeks continues: intermittent strikes, a US blockade that raises costs and friction without fully stopping flow, and a toll dispute that neither side backs down from. Gulf cargoes keep arriving but at reduced, costlier volumes; August jet-fuel demand (about 40% higher than March) competes with road-fuel diesel for the same constrained refinery capacity; the EU's June 17 ban on short-term Russian pipeline gas contracts weighs on diesel throughout. Inventory cover stays thin — commercial cover already measured in weeks, ARA distillate stocks below the five-year average — and winter heating from October competes directly with transport diesel. By December, petrol drifts to ~82% and diesel to ~76% of normal, entering the rationing-risk zone for the first time on this chart's base case.
Scenario 3Escalation tail — a further kinetic cycle opens a new front (~25%, up from 10%). A Bab el-Mandeb front opens alongside Hormuz, or a strike lands on Kharg Island itself (ORF Middle East estimates a simultaneous Hormuz + Bab el-Mandeb disruption puts ~25% of global oil and gas and ~30% of container shipping at risk, ~$10B/day in trade); Cape of Good Hope reroutes add 12–15 days and ~$1M per voyage. On top of that, Moscow redirects volumes rather than complying with the EU's June 17 ban, suspending TurkStream and Tengiz-Novorossiysk flows (officially blamed on Ukrainian drone damage) and redirecting remaining oil and product volumes to higher-paying Asian buyers. Diesel degrades faster than petrol because it is more exposed to both the lost Gulf and Russian flows and the heating-season pull. By December, diesel falls to ~48% and petrol to ~58% of normal — worse than the prior model's 52%/61%, reflecting the demonstrated pattern of repeated re-escalation through 2026 — the level at which rationing-type controls spread well beyond Hungary into a wider cluster of member states.
Russia factorWhy Russia bends all three lines. Russia is now a smaller direct supplier to Europe than before 2022 — Russian crude is already under 3% of EU oil imports and pipeline gas/LNG down to roughly 13% — so this is not a 2022-style dependency shock. But two things still move the curves: first, the EU's own ban on Russian short-term pipeline gas contracts took effect June 17, 2026 — removing residual supply in all three scenarios and tightening diesel through gas-to-power substitution; second, Moscow retains the option to pre-empt further by suspending TurkStream and Tengiz-Novorossiysk (which would likely be blamed on Ukrainian drone damage) and redirecting remaining oil and product volumes to higher-paying Asian buyers, which would pull that loss forward and deepen the downside in Scenario 3. The effect is diesel-weighted — petrol is only lightly exposed to the gas bans directly — and it is the reason even the de-escalation scenario settles near 92–96% rather than a clean 100%.
MethodThis is a scenario forecast, not a prediction. The observed Jan–Jul 14 line is built from confirmed government measures and import-flow data; the Jul–Dec branches are illustrative model paths, REBUILT from scratch on Jul 14 after the Jun 17 MoU broke down, and are not guarantees. The real outcome will depend on whether the US blockade and 20% transit toll persist, escalate further (a Bab el-Mandeb front, a Kharg Island strike), or de-escalate; winter severity; refinery uptime; and whether Russia redirects volumes rather than complying with the EU's import bans. Sources: GIE AGSI+, IEA Oil Market Report, Cirium/ICIS Europe jet deficit estimates, ADNOC, ORF Middle East (dual-chokepoint impact), EU REPowerEU phase-out regulation (Russian gas ban dates), Council of the EU, national energy regulators and government decrees, CNBC/CNN/Al Jazeera/Bloomberg (Jul 13 Brent settle $83.30, blockade reinstatement, transit toll), Kpler/Windward (Hormuz transit data). Per-disruption detail and the live EU shortage map at global-energy-flow.com/shortages/eu/.