UK Jet Fuel & Road Fuel — 2026 Three-Scenario Forecast
UK jet-fuel days-of-cover from March through year-end vs. the IEA 23-day operational threshold, re-weighted after the US-Iran interim deal: network-holds is now the base case, with the Goldman threshold-breach projection and a broader retail crack as lower-probability paths.
UK jet-fuel days-of-cover in 2026: observed to July 1, plus three forecasts to year-end
Y-axis is days of jet-fuel inventory cover at UK aggregate level. The 23-day line is the IEA's operational threshold — below it, refuelling reliability degrades and physical airport shortages start; above it, the system can absorb demand spikes. Solid line is observed through July 1 (the last confirmed IATA/DfT print); the Jul 1–Aug 16 continuation is an estimate, not a confirmed data point, shown dashed/lighter to mark that distinction. Since this chart was last drawn, the war has gone through a full cycle of diplomatic movement and reversal: a direct US strike on Iran, a Hormuz route understanding between Iran and Oman, stricter-than-expected Iranian parliamentary terms, Iran denying active US talks outright, and now signs the two sides are edging closer again on routes specifically -- even as Brent rose almost 6% this week on continued vessel attacks. GEF's own AIS audit still shows the Hormuz core holding throughout, so the scenario weights reflect genuine uncertainty rather than a confirmed trajectory in either direction — "threshold breach" remains the base case.
One data point = the estimated UK aggregate jet-fuel inventory expressed as days of forward demand cover, drawing on IATA Jet Fuel Monitor (weekly), ACI Europe stock estimates, DfT operational reporting, and Cirium flight-schedule data. Individual airports vary widely; major hubs (LHR, LGW, MAN) sit modestly above the aggregate, secondary fields modestly below. No UK-specific NOTAM or cancellation reporting has been found as of this rebuild — the absence of fresh disruption reporting is read as continued stability at the ground level even as the geopolitical backdrop deteriorates, not as a data gap.
Where each metric lands by December 31, 2026
Today (Aug 16) — estimated, no fresh IATA/DfT print confirmed since Jul 1
~24 days
Last CONFIRMED print: ~26.5 days (Jul 1). No fresher IATA/DfT print found as of this rebuild — the ~24-day figure is inferred from the stalled Hormuz recovery and the deteriorating political situation, not a direct observation. Still above the IEA 23-day threshold, but the margin remains uncertain.
Scenario 1 — Network holds
~29 days
MINORITY PATH (~15%, down from 20%). This path requires the mediator-proposed 10-day ceasefire to genuinely hold and the interim deal to be revived — the opposite of what's happened at each prior turn this year.
Scenario 2 — Threshold breach
~20 days
BASE CASE (~50%). Neither the ceasefire proposal nor the Houthi embargo fully resolves the situation. Cover stays below 23 days through much of H2, troughing near 14 days in late September, recovering only to ~20 days by December — still below the IEA threshold at year-end.
Scenario 3 — Broader retail crack
~11 days
HELD at ~35%. This scenario describes a further major kinetic shock -- of the kind that already occurred this week (the direct US strike on Iran, the Damietta drone strike) -- pushing jet inventory troughs deeper, ~8 days end-Sep, deep physical-shortage territory. Cancellations 10–15%, road-fuel availability slips further. Trump's deferred-strike announcement and the Iran-Oman talks work against this scenario materializing, but neither is yet a confirmed, physical change.
Background reference
5-yr norm: 35 days IEA threshold: 23 days
5-yr seasonal norm for UK jet-fuel cover sits around 35 days. The IEA 23-day threshold is the operational trigger for physical airport shortages (per ACI Europe's Apr 9 letter to the EU Transport Commissioner).
Crude backdrop, Aug 16
Brent ~$100 broke $100 for first time since May
Brent whipsawed hard this week: a 3-day ~16% diplomatic-optimism slide to $84.09 Tuesday, then +7.91% Wednesday on the direct US strike on Iran, then Friday's unconfirmed Iranian tanker claim, then Monday's 5.16% drop to $83.39 on Trump's strike-deferral announcement -- one of the most volatile weeks of the entire war, netting out close to where it started despite enormous intra-week swings.
MarAprMayJunJulAugSepOctNovDec
Jet-fuel days-of-cover — observed
Scenario 1: Network holds
Scenario 2: Threshold breach
Scenario 3: Broader retail crack
Forecast model · GEF supply-chain analysis · observed Mar–Jul 1 from IATA Jet Fuel Monitor, ACI Europe estimates, DfT operational reporting, Cirium flight data; Jul 1–Aug 16 estimated (no fresher confirmed print) · scenarios are illustrative, not guarantees · rebuilt Aug 16 as Iran/Oman edge closer on Hormuz routes amid continued vessel attacks (threshold-breach stays the base case)global-energy-flow.com · July 21, 2026
Reading the chart. The solid blue line is the observed UK aggregate jet-fuel days-of-cover from March 1 -- when the Strait of Hormuz closure first began propagating through European refining margins -- through July 1, the last confirmed IATA/DfT print. Cover drifted from roughly 32 days at the start of March to about 23-24 days by mid-June, briefly rebuilding to ~26.5 days by July 1 -- still above the IEA's 23-day operational threshold (the red horizontal line). The dashed/lighter continuation from Jul 1 to Aug 16 is an estimate, not a confirmed print, holding broadly flat around 24-24.5 days given no evidence of dramatic change either way. Green if a genuine, lasting stand-down takes hold (Scenario 1, a minority path); amber if brief pauses keep breaking into fresh kinetic events without a decisive move either way (Scenario 2, the base case); or red if a further major kinetic shock cracks aviation supply chains, spreading to UK retail road fuel (Scenario 3, a widened tail). The "today" line marks where the modelled paths begin diverging from the observed/estimated line.
Scenario 1Network holds -- a minority path (~15%, down from 20%). This path requires the mediator-proposed 10-day ceasefire to genuinely hold and produce a real revival of the interim deal -- something that has not happened at any prior turn this year (the Jun 17 MoU itself broke down within weeks). The DfT's last confirmed schedule analysis (through Jun 14) showed under 1% of planned flights cancelled, and major carriers had been telling markets they expected stable summer supply via non-Gulf imports and hedging -- Easyjet reported 70% of summer 2026 hedged, Lufthansa's 20,000 already-announced cancellations were absorbing the demand bulge they were intended to. That operational resilience hasn't been directly falsified; GEF's own AIS still shows the Hormuz core holding. But the credibility of a genuine de-escalation path has eroded with each successive framework breakdown. If this path holds anyway, cover would gradually rebuild to about 29 days by December, still below the 5-year norm of 35 days.
Scenario 2Threshold breach -- the base case (~50%). This remains the path the situation most closely resembles: neither a genuine ceasefire nor a further sharp escalation, just continued high-tension standoff. UK aviation's heavy dependence on imported refined product (Britain refines a smaller share of its own jet fuel than France or Germany) leaves it exposed. Aggregate cover stays below or near 23 days through much of the second half of the year, troughs at about 14 days in late September, and only partially recovers to about 20 days by December, still below the IEA threshold at year-end. NOTAMs become likely at multiple secondary airports during the trough; cancellations climb toward 6-9% of scheduled departures.
Scenario 3Broader retail crack -- a widened tail (~35%). This scenario describes a further major kinetic shock -- of exactly the kind that already occurred this week, when the US struck Iran directly and a drone hit a US-owned LNG vessel at Egypt's Damietta port. If a comparable or larger shock recurs, UK jet-fuel cover would degrade faster than in Scenario 2, troughing at about 8 days in late September, below even ACI Europe's April 9 hub-level warning of 8-10 days at the worst-affected hubs. Cancellations would likely reach 10-15% of scheduled departures; multiple airports would issue NOTAMs. The same conditions that crack aviation also reach retail: UK petrol and diesel availability could slip further, with the first reports of intermittent station outages. By December, jet cover would recover only to about 11 days -- still deep in physical-shortage territory.
UK factorWhy the UK is different from the EU forecast. The EU forecast on this site tracks aggregate petrol and diesel availability as a percentage of normal supply -- appropriate because the EU's stress is currently broad and road-fuel-led (Germany's PCK Schwedt feedstock cut among others, though Schwedt has since found a partial Poland-routed workaround). The UK's stress is narrower and aviation-led. UK retail road fuel has held throughout the crisis -- Transport Secretary Heidi Alexander has said publicly there are "no immediate supply issues" -- but the UK aviation system remains the European market analysts have flagged as most likely to break first, and the base case (Scenario 2) keeps that break as the modelled central path, not a tail risk. UK Day +N -- the count of days past Ryanair CEO Michael O'Leary's May 4 cliff edge -- is the operational counter on the parent page. A growing Day +N does not straightforwardly signal accumulating credibility for the network-holds case -- the underlying Hormuz/Bab el-Mandeb political situation, not the absence of an aviation-specific breach, is what will move this forecast next. This week's turn -- Trump's deferred-strike announcement and Iran's "final stages" Oman-talks claim -- is genuinely the most significant diplomatic signal of the cycle, but GEF treats it the same as every prior claimed development: seriously, but not confirmed until it shows up physically.
MethodThis is a scenario forecast, not a prediction. The observed Mar-Jul 1 line is built from IATA Jet Fuel Monitor weekly prints, ACI Europe stock estimates, DfT operational reporting of schedule cancellations, and Cirium airport-level cancellation data; the Jul 1-21 extension is an inference from the deteriorating political situation and stalled Hormuz recovery, not a fresh print of the underlying metric itself, and is labelled as such throughout this page. The Jul 21-Dec branches are illustrative model paths, rebuilt on this date to reflect the MoU's collapse and the Houthi Saudi-embargo declaration; the real outcome will depend on whether the mediator-proposed ceasefire genuinely holds, whether the Houthi embargo converts to an actual shipping strike, August weather (a hot August lifts jet demand further), and refinery uptime in the North Atlantic basin. Sources: IEA Oil Market Report (May 2026), IATA Jet Fuel Monitor (weekly, last confirmed print wk ending Jul 13 at $127.06/bbl; this week's Jul 20 print not yet posted as of this rebuild), ACI Europe letter to EU Transport Commissioner Apr 9, UK Department for Transport schedule analysis (through Jun 14, no fresher cancellation data found), Cirium UK cancellations dataset, Reuters/AP/Al Jazeera (MoU suspension, Jordan strike, ceasefire proposal, Houthi embargo reporting, Jul 17-20), GEF's own AIS chokepoint audit (6 frames, Fri night-Tue AM). Per-pin detail and the live UK aviation watchlist at global-energy-flow.com/shortages/united-kingdom/.